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Introduction 
On 28 June 2004, Iraq was declared sovereign. The coalition did not, however, turn over 
functional sovereignty to Iraqis on the very matters that Arabs, conscious of a legacy of 
colonialism, consider to be essential to sovereignty: borders, internal security, internal political 
order and legal system, and economic policies. This was a wise decision. Still, "sovereignty" and 
"independence" have quite freighted connotations in Arab political parlance. As long as the 
coalition continues, in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, to "borrow" Iraq's sovereignty, 
the "true" colonialist intent of the U.S. "occupation" will appear proven to Arabs in and out of 
Iraq.[1] 
 
There is another problem. Recently, U.S. leaders have spoken of a strategy "to build Iraqi 
capacity and transfer responsibilities from the coalition to Iraq rapidly." Issues of key concern 
here have been listed as "transferring authority to a sovereign Iraq… security… rebuilding Iraq's 
infrastructure… enlisting international support, and continuing building on Iraq's capacity for self-
government."[2] Absent from this enumeration has been democratization. Those working in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom should be concerned. Casting aside WMD and al-Qa'ida-
linked terror as the reasons for unseating the Ba'th regime, what remains is the altruistic goal of 
introducing democracy to the heart of the Middle East, so that its re-oxygenated blood can radiate 
outwards to the rest of the region. If we take the planners of the Iraq war at their word, such 
aspirations expose the liberal inspiration of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy. 
Perils of Pragmatism and Expediency 
This very aspiration thus implies the problem. Granting sovereignty to Iraq did not at all assist in 
democratizing it. It was a mere fourteen months since defeating a regime that ruled for thirty-five 
years. Not only did this regime strip its subjects of their humanity, but it did so by perfecting 
methods crystallizing since the 1930s. The socio-political and psychological assumptions 
commensurate with creeping effacement of humanity had seventy years to stamp Iraqis' minds as 
they sought to cope with realities. These assumptions include pervasive fear, distrust, 
sidestepping of legitimate political and legal organs, espousal of violence as political and cultural 
expression, and mobilization according to reified primordial categories such as language, 
ethnicity, or religion. Given this, turning Iraq loose on Iraqis after fourteen months is not 
democratization. Further compounding the problem, the sovereignty of 30 June is incomplete, 
reinforcing Iraqis' mistrust of the United States.  
 
Still, the coalition granted sovereignty before democratization. Some may argue that 
democratization proceeds after institutions are established in a sovereign environment, when 
norms can then follow from procedural logic, and when those very institutions themselves will 
possess sovereign legitimacy. Yet, given its past, democratization in Iraq stands a better chance 
of success if it precedes full sovereignty. Of course, American fulfillment of its commitment to the 
former will require long-term infringement upon the latter, not to mention a much longer-term 
commitment than politically popular at home. Still, to go the other direction, and economize 
through a more "pragmatic" approach, will ultimately be more costly. 
Then or Now? 
To grasp the problem of "pragmatic" expediency, let us ponder a particular sequence of events: a 
military force conquers a country quite far from home, whose inhabitants are as culturally foreign 
to the conquerors as one could imagine. The previous leadership melts away, while the new force 
has very little knowledge of local political conditions and cultural norms, and very little training in 
the ways of post-war management of this particular population, so unlike others they have 
administered in their past. The arriving force has in its wings candidates for leadership with no 
local legitimacy, and fastens upon certain former political-military elites as crutches for its 
presence. The conquerors also locate presumably legitimate and powerful points of local social 
control, but find that these local leaders can exert such control only to the extent that the 
conquerors distort the social equilibrium by building them up, paying them off, yet allowing them 
the freedom to criticize and oppose the arriving forces.  
 
Broader circumstances are also difficult: the conqueror's forces on the ground are caught 
between different agencies' priorities back at home, each seeking to direct affairs in the newly 
liberated land according to their desires. Likewise, the conquering country is extremely 
overextended globally, such that fielding sufficient numbers of men to preserve order is 
impossible, as well as against the grain of defense decision makers' thinking. At the same time, 
the domestic economy is weak, many at home question the adventure, and several are repelled 
by news of high casualties. Within a year of conquest, rather than indigenous submission to 
foreign rule, revolts break out in several strategic centers, inspired by both nationalist and 
religious symbols. With mounting casualties and international criticism, the conquerors rely on 
superior technology in the absence of sufficient troops, but also come to the conclusion that they 
need to accommodate local elements in managing the country. 
 
The imperial overlords thus form a local government with the trappings of sovereignty, 
parliaments, and ministers—which are advised, paid-off, and only intermittently constrained by 
administrators from the conquering force. The new-old local leaders are entirely untested and 
thus untrustworthy in the way of such new-fangled institutions, which they choose to subvert. Still, 
the original conquerors, facing constant budget cuts and troop drawdowns, grant an early 
sovereignty so as to declare victory, economize, and preserve international legitimacy. As a result 
of such economies, the government, judicial, and civil society apparatuses are actively corrupted 
by the local leaders, while new social groups, in this case the junior-to-mid-level military officers, 
come to view it as their duty and right to hijack government. These new military leaders do not 
always share the same regional priorities of the erstwhile conquerors, even though they receive 
arms from them, and even though they have signed agreements regulating the ability of the 
conqueror's military to return. Ultimately, when global conditions darken for the conquering 
power, yet another military junta reneges on earlier treaties, instigates local violence, and forces 
the conqueror of a few decades before to reinvade the country, a mere decade after expediting its 
sovereignty. 
Getting on in Iraq… and Getting Away from Democracy 
This sequence of events does not arise from an imaginary country for the sake of doomsday 
prognostication: the conqueror was Britain, the country was Iraq, and the years were 1918 to 
1941. The epilogue to this story of insufficient human, material, and moral commitment combined 
with premature sovereignty in British Iraq was the bloody extermination of the British installed 
regime in 1958, inspiring Ba'th Party ideologues and a young Saddam Hussein. More important 
for today, however, is that the very events and dynamics setting Iraq up for failure sixty years ago 
are prominent in Iraq in 2004.  
 
One does not have to share the logic of the post-WWI mandates, which assumed that some 
peoples were insufficiently mature for sovereignty, in order to be quite wary about turning Iraq 
back over to the Iraqis. It also does not necessarily mean advocating a drawn-out occupation 
during which we arrogantly teach lesser peoples what it means to be democratically civilized. But, 
while the British did not feel it useful for Middle Easterners to have democracies, the United 
States has publicly and repeatedly committed itself to a democratic Iraq. Yet, democracy means 
much more than multi-party elections. Elections must be preceded by or at the least accompany 
in a phased fashion a whole series of preparatory steps, without which elections can actually 
undermine democratic consolidation by spurring chaos, violence, and further mobilization of 
primordial loyalties for exclusivist, zero-sum gain. Those inclined to think that a little bit of chaos is 
part and parcel of democratization—the "freedom is messy" approach—would be well-advised to 
consider the chaos of post-April 2003 Iraq itself.  
Liberating Iraq and Inhibiting Democracy? 
Circumstances to date have not permitted the United States to spur on any of the steps that lead 
towards democratization in Iraq, while the continuing insurgency has resulted in measures 
positively inhibiting democracy—most prominently, the norms, articles of political faith, rules of 
the game, procedures, and structures that ensure the kind of democracy rendering reinvasion 
unnecessary. 
 
As for measures potentially inhibiting democracy, we should consider our Iraqi points of contact. 
Since the Clinton years, they consisted of the Iraqi exile groups, as well as the political 
representatives of elements at off-and-on war with Saddam, such as the Kurds and Islamists. 
Whatever such people might be—nationalists of various colors, Marxists, Islamists, ex-Ba'thist 
generals, bankrollers, or technocrats—they have never acted in a democratic manner. So, with 
the exception of a few expatriate academician fellow travelers, the coalition went into Iraq with 
Iraqis who have no proven aptitude or commitment to democracy's norms and practices, but 
whom it then set up as the Interim Governing Council. This is not entirely unlike the British setting 
up the foreign Hashemite family in Baghdad, with their Arab nationalist fellow travelers. Also like 
the British, by focusing on our expatriate Iraqi "friends," we missed aspects of indigenous 
mobilization among Iraq's Shia, who could have proven more supportive had we not neglected 
them throughout the 1990s. 
 
Once in Iraq, military commanders—who had been provided a dearth of cultural and political 
intelligence background but who needed local liaisons—had no recourse under the pressure of 
time but to locate likewise inherently undemocratic points of contact. Some of these were town 
mayors: a sensible choice, but not stealth democrats. Others were family, clan, and tribal leaders. 
They fit in quite well with our preconceived notions of the "orient," and appeared to be local 
centers of power and influence based on the consensus of Iraqis. But there are two problems 
here. First—the obvious reason—no democrats here. Second, by fastening on such people, 
coalition forces actually read a socio-political map that made sense to them, but is in fact a map 
of Saddam Hussein's coercive making. Not only did he artificially elevate the conception of 
shaykhs' social control beyond what the societal equilibrium had arrived at over centuries, but he 
also artificially favored certain individual clan leaders or whole clans so as to frustrate national 
unity or political opposition. Working with these types makes sense as a stop-gap measure in the 
absence of cultural intelligence, but when it becomes the standard operating procedure, it actively 
inhibits the spread of all those procedures and norms that come before elections in the 
democratic count-down. 
A third group of local leaders that the coalition has alternately coaxed or cajoled comprises 
Muslim religious leaders. Again, it is natural to want them to support or at least passively condone 
the coalition's presence in Iraq. Just as naturally, particularly Shi'ite mujtahids want to reserve 
political power to themselves as a price for their (often begrudged) acceptance of the United 
States in Iraq. Representatives of high-level ayatollahs were granted positions at various times in 
the IGC. Likewise, in an effort to show the world that the US is not anti-Islam, and that it can 
accept political pluralism with Muslims and Islamists included, coalition authorities have continued 
to dialogue, and at times compromise with them.  
 
Still, we need to admit that orthodox religion—of the sort that embraces socio-politics—has no 
place for intellectual or political pluralism beyond parameters too narrow to accommodate 
democracy. Quite simply, the concern of traditional monotheistic religion—Muslim, Christian, or 
Jewish—is not democratic expression of differing views, styles of life, rituals and beliefs, or social 
practices. Rather, the concern of religions faithful to scripture and canonical corpuses of tradition 
is orthodoxy of belief and/or ritual as well as social practice. In any geographical setting, 
"religious" people who play according to the rules of the democratic game in fact depart from 
religious principles. 
 
The foregoing also means that the coalition has yet to set up the surrounding architecture of 
democracy-the institutions and guarantees that are more important than elections. It might seem 
non-democratic to determine from on high the text of a constitution, the shape and membership of 
governing bodies, and the procedures as well as body of law for a judicial system. In Iraq today, 
however, the only workable indigenous option is repression, now privatized on ethnic, religious, or 
geographic lines. Likewise, as we have seen in the past year, our Iraqi expatriate "friends" are not 
really our friends or those of their countrymen. We have also seen that at times we have 
accommodated our "friends" and those we want to be our friends too much, perhaps exposing a 
peculiar American weakness for wanting to be liked.  
 
As just one example of how short-term needs of the coalition have gotten in the way of 
democratizing Iraq, the interim constitution includes Islam as a source of legislation, apportioning 
to it a juridical role. One might say in justification that since Iraq is a Muslim country, its imams 
and ayatollahs have tremendous esteem. But again, we need to be frank: orthodox religions are 
not concerned to be democratic, so therefore religion, politics, and law do not mix in 
democracies—at least not statutorily. Put differently, if we sunder the linkage between liberal 
democracy and legal-political secularism, we mortally cripple democracy. One might also retort 
that rather than a hegemonic democratic model, different places and times require different kinds 
and ways of democracy. This seems to be the intent of statements that "Jeffersonian democracy" 
might be inappropriate to Iraq. Granted, but if biological metaphors are permitted, there are 
several different blood types—yet without certain basic components, the red liquid might as well 
be ketchup. Likewise, a government and legal system without secularism is not the kind of 
political system we say we are giving to Iraqis, as it will not guarantee the democratic freedom of 
religion. 
 
Again, since commanders on the ground received poor cultural intelligence and post-fighting 
planning; insufficient numbers of troops untrained for nation-building and constabulary operations; 
and inadequate funds for disbursement for time-intensive, democracy-supportive initiatives, what 
has been done up until now makes sense. Yet, stop-gap, interim measures can become long-
term policy, even though what works first does not always work best over time. Alternately, 
continually changing plans and stances, as was the case with the unceremonious shift from 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid to the Coalition Provisional Authority, and murky 
schemes and discussions regarding steps to elected government from November 2003 through to 
March 2004, undermines our credibility in Iraq, and threatens the coherence of our civil and 
military operations. 
 
It is also the case that we have yet to cultivate the most potentially supportive constituency for a 
democratizing, pluralist Iraq: the urban middle class white-collar professionals. Not only have 
such groups been the motors for democratization in the West, but they have also provided the 
intellectual luminaries of the Middle East for more than a century, attracted at different times to 
Marxism, pan-Arabism and Islamism—though originally to pro-western liberal democracy and 
secular nationalism. This stratum includes teachers, lawyers, journalists, technical and scientific 
experts, as well as small time entrepreneurs. The freedoms implied by socio-political and 
economic democracy appeal most to them, and threaten them the least. The coalition has built 
schools, but has it cultivated and empowered teachers? There are new courts, but has the 
coalition encouraged and supported independent lawyers? Likewise, there are coalition-
sponsored media outlets, but has coalition policy furthered the interests of independent-minded, 
critical journalists? Saddam worked diligently to co-opt, muzzle, anaesthetize or eliminate a 
societal autonomous middle class, and he was largely successful. Our active, nurturing cultivation 
of this social stratum thus becomes that much more important for democratization. Fighting the 
insurgency has likely made us delinquent in this respect, and while some might argue that we 
need to take social realities as they are in the middle of an insurgency rather than attempting to 
craft new ones, the Iraqi social reality on offer has only assisted the insurgency. 
Conditions: Necessary… and Sufficient? 
Granting limited sovereignty amid armed insurgency and a focus on building Iraq's coercive 
forces, we have not aided democracy. Additional surrounding conditions will also militate against 
a democratic Iraq. To enumerate a few, neighboring states will have to resist the temptation to 
support proxy militias and other factions. Leaders in Ankara, Damascus, Amman, Riyad, and 
Tehran will also have to engage the new country's leaders diplomatically while publicly 
advocating for democratic political transformation, even though this will have undesired domestic 
consequences for each state.  
 
For its part, after condemning the coalition's operations in Iraq, the UN will have to muster an 
international stabilization force large enough to put down the kind of disturbances that will prevent 
the UN's own reconstruction and democracy-building organs from functioning. This appears 
unlikely. Though several countries have indicated that absent a UN resolution or UN-managed 
Iraq they will not be able to contribute forces, such a resolution may still not elicit their assistance 
in light of the security difficulties already in evidence. Likewise, Muslim countries will be reluctant 
to engage in what their publics would easily call assisting a lingering U.S. occupation of Muslim 
lands. Alternately, certain Arab and Muslim leaders may find a perverse vindication in America 
failing at a mission they had opposed. 
 
In Iraq itself, the various Sunni, Shi'ite, Arab and Kurdish factions have to be convinced they have 
much to gain by acting in-system according to the rules of reciprocal legitimacy and freedom of 
dissent. This includes Ba'th-affiliated Sunnis who have witnessed a socio-political demotion, as 
well as their coreligionists who fear drowning in a sea of Shi'ite mullahs; Shi'ites inspired by 
Muqtada al-Sadr's distaste for the coalition as well as those adhering to the wishes of Ayatollah 
Sistani; and the Kurds of Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or Masud Barzani's Kurdish 
Democratic Party. The latter's region has become independent of Iraq in all but name, having 
wrangled out of CPA a "temporary" autonomous status repellant to Arab Iraqis. Finally, we must 
not forget the Iraqi expatriates who now feel they are being abandoned for unreconstructed 
Ba'this by the United States. This overloaded basket of factions threatens to turn the emergent 
government as well as coalition security forces into their pawns.  
 
Likewise, U.S. administrations for the next decade will have to continue to devote great sums of 
money and manpower to security forces that remain in the region. Further, civilian political 
reconstruction initiatives will need to be intensified, while infrastructural rebuilding will have to 
proceed apace, even—or especially—if security conditions remain precarious. And here, funding 
for physical reconstruction will have to increasingly reach its way into Iraqi hands, though the U.S. 
congress is likely to oppose this. Just as important, the division of power between Iraqi 
government and the coalition will very soon have to provide those Iraqis not yet turned against us 
with enough of a sense of sovereignty so that they do not feel their country to be another veiled 
protectorate. 
 
Finally, unless broader regional dynamics, in Afghanistan, Iran, southeastern Turkey, and the 
Israeli-Palestinian arena remain sufficiently stable, United States and regional states' attention is 
likely to be distracted away from the needed support of the Iraqi government and hopefully 
emergent civil society. Conversely, to the extent that the Arab-Israeli conflict or Afghanistan 
remains unsettled, Iraq will prove an even more attractive arena for anti-U.S. insurgencies.  
These conditions do not comprise an exhaustive list of all those things that will need to happen 
for Iraq to gain any stability and have any chance at evolving over the long term into a 
democracy. This is because Iraq received sovereignty before its political institutions were 
convincingly rehabilitated, before the rules of socio-political inclusion were meaningfully changed, 
and in the absence of convincing security for Iraqis and coalition forces. In short, too many 
essential pieces of the puzzle have to fit just right for an extended period of time.  
 
In spite of sovereignty, then, an ultimately democratic Iraq will require a much longer-term, much 
more expensive and hands-on American investment in human and material terms than has been 
the case until now. Basically, having failed to provide democracy in 14 months—not as much a 
failure as an iron law of time—U.S. leaders, service people, and private citizens will have to work 
even harder, but now within the framework of a sovereign state. According to the implicit logic of 
Transitional Administration Law, the real bump up in Iraqi sovereignty is 31 January 2005, when 
elections occur for a constituent assembly and interim parliament. Never mind that Iraqis do not 
see it that way; in effect it means that we are providing sovereignty before elections, and then 
elections before democracy. Either way, six additional months is hardly enough time to 
communicate and ingrain democratic procedures and norms.  
 
The Work Ahead 
What are some of elements of this work on the road to democratization? Most basically, we must 
provide safety and security for all Iraqis equally, so that legalism and civility are better bets than 
clans, militias, and insurgency. Our law and order has to perform better than any other option. 
This is also true for legal procedures associated with coalition law enforcement. As such, due 
process must be accorded to as many Iraqis as safety permits. In this respect, we will have to 
share with Iraqis the judicial norms of democratic societies. In doing so, we should be as open as 
logistically possible to the participation of international legal bodies and eventually Iraqis 
themselves. As an adjunct to this, economic reconstruction of Iraq should be internationalized, so 
that U.S. companies do not monopolize contracts. This will show Iraqis that American-style 
democratic sovereignty amounts to more than economic imperialism. Further, by opening 
reconstruction even to people whose governments opposed the war, the United States can 
ensure that those very governments will become committed to our success in Iraq.  
 
More fundamentally, through providing the right kinds of incentives, the coalition will have to 
ensure that a new Iraqi government issues legislation and laws guaranteeing freedom of 
expression as broadly as possible. As in many western democracies, such freedom of expression 
will have to be tempered only by other legislation requiring Iraqis to grant each other reciprocal 
legitimacy and access to social services, no matter what one's political, religious, ethnic, or 
lifestyle views. These are the norms that guarantee democratic consolidation, and may be further 
ingrained by laws proscribing the formation of political parties based on religion or ethnicity. 
 
Norms emerge partially out of practices, and as such the coalition forces will have to be very 
careful as regards the messages their own practices send—as just one example, the closing of 
the Sadrist newspaper in March 2004 sent the wrong message, no matter how libelous the paper 
indeed was. Beyond teaching though example, however, norms are communicated through 
explicit teaching. National education, therefore, on the primary and secondary level, is probably 
the most important tool in communicating democracy and mutual tolerance. It is not enough to 
build schools and issue texts. We will need to create a new teaching corps through great 
expenditures of money. And, a major curricular message will have to be not so much the national 
homogeneity of all Iraqis that denies difference, but conscious multiculturalism celebrating 
difference as a sign of national strength. Unlike in the United States, this will require state 
education, though with a much larger space for private schooling than any time since 1958. Real 
democratization will also need to account for curricular messages beyond the state sector, in 
Islamic madrasas. This will be exceedingly difficult, but necessary.  
 
Like post-WWII Germany, democracy education will also need to include Iraqi teachers' extended 
tours of American and European schools, pursuit of teachers' training and education degrees in 
the United States and elsewhere, and American, European, and Middle Eastern teachers 
volunteering to serve in Iraq-all on the U.S. tab. Not only will such activities permit Iraqis their own 
agency in translating liberating ideas for themselves and their fellow citizens, but Iraqi educators 
will also become a key indigenous support group to the coalition, based on their professional 
interests as well as evolving ideological convictions. 
 
To the extent that legislation and laws can mold norms, the basic laws of political parties and 
division of governmental powers will have to ensure that a party-government-state identity no 
longer emerge. A U.S.-style separation of powers is not essential here. Rather, the coalition 
needs to prevent a situation where leaders come to view state organs as tools of their political 
parties. Just as important, structurally and legislatively, the government—as majority 
parliamentary faction and cabinet—must be inhibited from seeing itself and acting as the 
monopolistic embodiment of state and nation. Again, this is quite difficult to effect. These 
problems however, have been the defining symptoms of diseased political orders throughout the 
Middle East for the last half-century. 
 
According to many, civilian control of the military is a key component of democratic governance. 
When we consider that Saddam Hussein was a civilian and controlled the military quite well, this 
issue does not seem as important in the near-to-mid-term. What will have to be insisted upon, 
however, both in law and coalition practice, is that the military not have any domestic coercive or 
political role. Not only will coalition forces have to resist each and every temptation to use the 
Iraqi army domestically, but also a gradual shift in the face and function of the Iraqi National 
Guard (previously called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps) away from a military-like force will need to 
be a priority. This is not the current direction of Iraqi and coalition thinking. Further, promotion and 
operational command need to be determined not by political popularity or assumed loyalty, but by 
verified military professionalism. 
 
Beyond all this, much discussion of democratization during the 1990s revolved around the need 
for civil society-citizen groups not government-established or dependent, but acting in the social 
sphere with an amount of autonomy not preventing them from making citizens' views known to 
the government. In Iraq's current situation, this is tricky—the last thing the coalition needs is the 
proliferation of unmonitored sectoral-interest based groupings that could easily take the Lebanon 
route to militias and civil war. In this context, the coalition forces and administrators themselves, 
at first in place of the Iraqi government, will have to facilitate, nurture, and monitor citizens' groups 
through legal provisions, funding and policing. Over time, as the Iraqi government begins to 
undertake such functions, civil society groups themselves should be encouraged to establish 
connections with counterparts in Europe and the United States, as well as groups in selected 
Middle Eastern countries that have made strides in this area. In the mid-term a form of civil 
society will emerge that is more dependent on state-like bodies than is the case in the West. Still, 
what will have been gained in terms of associational spirit and free intellectual mingling will be 
more important. 
 
Responsibilities and Ironies 
This initial agenda for post-sovereignty democratization is already incredibly weighty, requiring 
great amounts of handholding as well as letting go. Some might rightfully argue that it is not 
reflective of regional realities. Indeed, the initiatives here are unlikely to be accomplished by the 
30 January 2005 election date. Rather, they will probably require at least a decade to take firm 
root, and none of it can be done on autopilot or through remote control. Yet, a decade is not on 
overly long commitment when compared to the more than half-century of mounting repression 
preceding it. Further, without securing these very conditions through close monitoring and 
involvement, Iraq will not only be undemocratic, but it will go on to be a source of instability, 
violence, and trouble for the United States. 
 
There remains a painful irony in this agenda for Iraqi democratization. The only way to make the 
sacrifices of American service people and families worth it is for the United States to remain 
intensively engaged with Iraq for a long time—i.e., we will have to do it right. Doing it right 
however, will certainly mean more loss of American lives, accompanied by an ever decreasing 
American willingness to stay the course.  
 
Still, to be worthy of the lives Americans have lost in Iraq, we cannot do minimalist democracy. 
We must be maximalist in our definition of democracy, as well as in our efforts to achieve it. In a 
place like Iraq, minimalist democratization, or a lackadaisical timetable, will result in no 
democracy. This is not like post-war Germany, where there had been a tradition of some political 
pluralism and parliamentary government before the aberration of 1933-1945. Iraq possesses no 
such heritage. To the extent that democratic headway has been made at all in the Middle East, it 
has been when leaders swept the decks clear and brooked no opposition. The substance and 
methods of Turkey's post WWI reform process are instructive here. Notwithstanding some of their 
illiberal tendencies, Turkey's new leaders eschewed minimalism, and as a result, Turkey is today 
an at least partially consolidated democracy in terms of procedures, structures, and most 
importantly, norms. 
 
A further reason American actions in Iraq cannot be minimalist on democratization relates to this 
region's strategic importance to the US. At the risk of oversimplification, the United States cannot 
afford Iraq a decade on to be like Haiti today. The Middle East, given its positioning next to the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia, as well as its resources, demographic changes, and 
persisting conflicts, is not the Caribbean. Compared to Haiti, Iraq is a shopping mall of weapons 
and ideologies, and a re-intervention, as in Haiti this year and the British in Iraq in 1941, is 
unlikely to overcome congressional, popular, and regional opposition. Ultimately, as the Middle 
East is so important to us and we have inserted ourselves so deeply into Iraq, long-term success 
there is a prerequisite for our status in the region.  
 
After the installation of an Iraqi president, prime minister, and cabinet, the United States must 
reinvigorate its commitment to succeed where Ottomans, British, and Iraqis themselves have 
failed, as each failure has prepared future disasters. No matter who the occupant of the White 
House after January 2005, that person needs to recognize the necessity of fully reforming Iraq, 
for the sake of regional stability, our own strategic interests, and the dignity of those who have 
fallen in its pursuit. No particular date should be considered an opportune time to declare victory 
and leave Iraq. As one Marine said to me, "we broke Iraq, so now we have to fix it. I just hope we 
have the right tools in the toolbox, and stick around to finish the repair job."[3] 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month email ccc@nps edu with subject line "Subscribe" There is no charge and your
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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